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Frankino and Sneed: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT

Edited and with an introduction by Alan F. Westin.
New York: The Macmillan Co. 1963. PP 475. Price $7.50.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it this way: "You cannot tell the
quality or the importance of a man on the Supreme Court solely
from his opinions." Alan Westin has applied the same principle
to the Court as an institution. This "autobiography" is an anthology of out-of-Court commentary by United States Supreme
Court Justices. The Justices speak out on legal questions, politics, other members of the Court, broad movements in law
and society, and on the Court itself. No matter what the subject
might be, the Supreme Court as a part of our political and judicial
tradition is the primary object of elucidation. This collection, then,
is an attempt to tell the quality and importance of the Supreme
Court apart from its opinions.
We read an autobiography not so much to get at the truth
of facts or events, but to discover attitude, viewpoint, character,
belief and other indications of the subjective man. While an
autobiography can be crucial in understanding a man, corporate
autobiographies" are seldom helpful. The Supreme Court is an
exception. Its internal management, functioning, and the genesis
of its opinions are hidden from public view. They are locked in
sanctum sanctorum of the conference room. This collection of
comments by members of the Court speaking off the bench during
their tenure is important in that it allows us to enter the conference room. The institution cannot write its own autobigraphy but
its constituent members, the Justices from Jay to Warren, have
painted a penetrating and oftentimes entertaining portrait of this
"storm centre."
When the lawyer lays aside the United States Reports, texts
on Constitutional Law, and legal and political treatises he has
an incomplete picture. To add another aspect to our understanding we can look to this "informal account of the growth and
development" of the Court. These out-of-Court comments have
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been available before. The value of this book is that Mr. Westin
has organized and presented them with skill and discrimination.
In his introduction Mr. Westin traces the history of cbmmentary by Justices and the attitudes of the Justices to such
comments. This is a fascinating account of means taken to solve
the dilemma of speaking freely in the public forum without violating the essentials of judicial discretion. In the early years
Federalist judges campaigned from the stump for candidates of
their choice and used charges to grand juries on the circuit to
comment on important political and legal matters. The most important count in the impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase was his
inflammatory charge to a Baltimore jury upholding the Alien and
Sedition Acts and condemning the Jeffersonians. Reaction to this
dragging of the ermine in political mire resulted in what has been
styled as "judicial lockjaw". Yet the most discrete of Justices has
a boiling point as is demonstrated in two selections by Chief Justice Marshall defending his decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Mr. Westin concludes his analysis of the conflict between
free speech and judicial lockjaw with this comment on the recent Court:
". Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Frankfurter spoke often
and in substantively important fashion. Justices Black, Whittaker, and Stewart spoke less often. Justice Clark speaks
primarily about the formal internal practices of the Court
when he discusses judicial affairs. Justice Harlan speaks occasionally, in sober and guarded fashion. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren is a constant speaker, but generally in the tradition
of the broad, ceremonial commentator rather than in the
Douglas-Brennan-Frankfurter manner.
The collection itself consists of thirty-eight selections from
the writings and speeches of such as John Marshall, Joseph Story,
David Brewer, Charles Evans Hughes and such contemporary
Justices as Jackson, Clark, Frankfurter, Brennan, Douglas, Black
and Chief Justice Warren. The selections are divided into three
parts: comments by Justices of the historic period from 1790-1941,
biographical comments on fellow Justices by other members of
the Court, and, finally, comments by members of the contemporary Supreme Court.
In the historical selections are some fascinating materials.
Chase's invective charge to grand jurymen in a Baltimore inn and
Iredell's charge on liberty and sedition are interesting comments
on controversial political matters. Brewer's "The Nation's Safeguard" represents the floodtide of the Court's protection of property and capital. For example, noting that an Englishman's home
could not be violated even by the King, Justice Brewer turned his
attention to the United States:
"Here, there is no monarch threatening trespass upon the in-
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dividual. The danger is from the multitudes-the majority,
with whom is the power; and if the passage quoted is the
grandest tribute to the liberty which existed in England, I
would thus paraphrase it to describe that which should prevail under this government by the people: The property of
a great railroad corporation stretches far away from the
domicile of its owner, through State after State, from ocean
to ocean; the rain and the snow may cover it; the winds and
the storms may wreck it; but no man or multitude dare touch
a car or move a rail. It stands secure in the eye and in the
custody of the law, as the purposes of justice in the thought
of God."
This is one of many interesting examples of the judicial omniscience which gave rise to the era of rule by injunction. The historical section ends with excellent selections by Chief Justice
Hughes and Justices John Clarke and James Byrnes on the judicial crises of the New Deal.
Part Two contains several biographical sketches of Justices
by their fellow Justices. There is a warm personal tribute to Chief
Justice Marshall by his friend Joseph Story, a fascinating eulogy
by Benjamin R. Curtis on the death of Chief Justice Taney which
is a welcome commentary on the stature and contribution of a
great jurist who is too often solely associated with his unfortunate
decision in the Dred Scott case. There are also tributes to the first
Justice Harlan by Brewer, to Holmes by Frankfurter, Hughes by
Roberts, and Brandeis by Justice Jackson. The most interesting of
the pieces in this section is "Justice Roberts and the 'Switch in
Time'." In this selection Justice Frankfurter comments on the celebrated reversal of decisions on the constitutionality of New Deal
legislation.
"To have known 'what really happened' while many historians and political scientists were weaving elaborate myths
about the Courts switch in 1937 must have been a heavy
burden. Justice Frankfurter laid a bit of this load down with
an address printed here, certainly one of the most facinating
and revealing "disclosures" in out-of-Court commentary."
The final 225 pages of this "autobiography" are by far the
most valuable to the practising lawyer and the student of our
constitutional processes. Entitled simply "Part Three/The Contemporary Supreme Court" the fifteen selections are out-of-Court
comments by Warren, Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, Clark, Jackson
and Justice Brennan. Here are collected important statements
on the very fundamentals of our judicial process by the men
charged with the responsibility of decision. These selections alone
make Mr. Westin's anthology an important addition to every
lawyer's library. The titles recite their scope but it would be dif-
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ficult to adequately express their depth and significance. Mr.
Westin has summarized it this way:
"Partly to dispel the myths about the Court's practices and
partly to give listeners an inside feeling (without violating
proprieties), the Justices today have developed a rather uniform word portrait of how a case is decided from application
for certiorari until announcement of opinion in open court."
Not only does this remarkable collection present an invaluable
aid to the lawyer's theorizing about or "second guessing" the Court,
but it also lays bare the great cleavage in the contemporary Court.
The so-called "liberals" and "conservatives" are presented and the
massive collision between the two positions is sharply drawn. These
differences, which reached such impassioned and eloquent airing
in Baker v. Carr, should not give critics of the Court any succor.
When the last page of Mr. Westin's collection is closed it is well
to recall Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' admonition:
"The history of scholarship is a record of disagreements. And
when we deal with questions relating to principles of law and
their application, we do not suddenly rise into a stratosphere
of icy certainty."
Whether an individual Justice spoke often out of Court as
did Justices Brewer and Douglas, or whether they declined to
speak as did Justices Cardoza and Brandeis, or spoke seldom, as
Justices Story, Holmes and Chief Justice Marshall, Mr. Westin finds
that the comments made are significant. I feel certain the reader
will agree.
Steven P. Frankino
Assistant Professorof Law
Catholic University of America
CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER?
By Beryl Harold Levy. New York: Chilton. 1961. PP. 175. Price
$4.00.
Corporation Lawyer: Saint or Sinner? is not a law book;
it is a sociological analysis of contemporary practitioners of
the law. It does not concern law; it is about lawyers. As such,
the book must be categorized with such social studies as Vance
Packard's Status Seekers, David Riesman's Lonely Crowd and
William Whyte's OrganizationMan.
Like Packard, Riesman and Whyte, Beryl Harold Levy explores an area of modern life in an attempt to formulate a general
explanation of certain patterns and habits of professional behavior which he has observed among lawyers. Like Packard, Riesman
and Whyte, Levy constructs a stereotyped man to personify the
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general characteristics of a group, in this case, a professional group.
Unlike Packard who ridicules his Status Seeker, Riesman who
pities his "other directed" man and Whyte who scorns his Organization Man, Levy neither praises or condemns his Corporation
Lawyer.
The book's title presents an excellent summary of its contents
since the author first draws a portrait of the corporation lawyer
-who he is, what he does and how he does it-and then presents
grounds on which the reader, if he chooses, may formulate his
own opinions and pass his own judgment.
Using the literary method of contrast and juxtaposition, Levy
outlines his picture of the corporation lawyer by a comparison
between the Illinois lawyer of Lincolns time who spent his time
in the courtroom and the contemporary metropolitan lawyer whose
practice centers around the conference room in his office. Whereas the Illinois lawyer often concerned himself with jury cases
regarding the ownership of farm animals, the "big leagu&' urban
lawyer is seen counselling corporate clients in intricate problems of business organization, financial arrangements, taxation
and security regulation. The 19th century lawyer speaks a simple
language as contrasted to the office lawyer's vocabularly which
reflects the complexities of federal legislation and rules and regulations of numerous alphabetized government agencies.
With the IRS, the FTC, the ICC, the SEC, etc. and the
Delaware General Corporation Law the office lawyer has little
time or interest left for torts, criminal law and domestic difficulties, the result being that much of the legal service once handled
by lawyers like the Illinois lawyer is now handled by Public Defenders and Legal Referral Services. Yet, criminal law and torts
form the foundation of individual rights and liberties. Levy seems
to wonder if the individual has been forgotten by the modern
layer.
The corporation lawyer "belongs" to the large firm and ihuch
of the book is devoted to an analysis of such major New York
"law factories" as Sullivan and Cromwell, Davis Polk and Cravath with their dozens of partners and scores of associates. Against
a background of the inevitable specialization and departmentalization Levy's main concern is wvith the men in the firms and here
the thoughts of Biesman and Whyte become quite noticeable.
Biographical sketches of the founders and builders of the
firms illustrate how much these men resemble the founders and
builders of giant corporations-men of dynamic vigor and ambition as well as professional competence. Like Whyte's corporate
executive, the heads of the large firms are seen as men able to
run the organization without becoming tied to the organizational
way of life. These are the "inner directed" men. On the other
hand, the men on the lower rungs of the firm's ladder resemble
the organization men of the corporations by whom the firm is
retained-personally and professionally conforming and "other
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directed". This makes sense since the law firm's associate's best
friends are probably corporate junior executives.
Levy, as a student of Professor Elliott Cheatham, is naturally
concerned with the state of the legal profession, yet he neither
portrays the corporation lawyer as a saint or as a sinner. If judgment is to be passed, the reader must do it himself and the reader
should see that an absolute and unqualified application of either
label would be without justice for the corporation lawyer is both
a saint and a sinner-he is a saint in his professional competence
but he is a sinner in his neglect of the lawyex's traditional responsibility as the protector of individual rights and liberties.
James L. Sneed
Attorney at Law
Tulsa, Oklahoma
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